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Experience clearly suggests that most legal philosophers and ethicists are not surprised to be told that liberal states cannot permissibly prohibit same-sex marriage (henceforth: SSM).​[1]​  It is somewhat less clear just what the appropriate liberal strategy is and should be in defense of this thesis.
One way to defend SSM on liberal grounds is to invoke some right jealously guarded by liberals that requires the legal recognition of SSM—say, the right to marry simpliciter or, alternatively, the right to privacy or “to be let alone.”  But spelling out the relevant right claim is tricky business and even proponents of SSM do not necessarily agree about how the relevant right claim is to be spelled out.  Thus, proponents of SSM appeal variously to the right to marry somebody that one loves​[2]​ and the right fulfill a shared desire to make a familiar sort of legally binding mutual commitment​[3]​ and the right to marry whomever one wishes and to have that marriage publicly recognized.​[4]​ Alternatively, proponents of SSM could appeal to something akin to the right to substantive due process or equal protection under the law, and so forth.  There is something of an embarrassment of riches here: why should liberals prefer to defend SSM by appeal to one such right rather than another? And if so many of these right claims seem plausible, then what exactly is all the fuss about?
My own reluctance to appeal to some right claim to defend SSM only signals my uncertainty—not my hostility—to such a strategy.  Rather than try to defend SSM directly, I shall proceed indirectly by arguing that SSM prohibitions are indefensible on liberal grounds.  Initially, I shall consider what I take to be the most powerful liberal argument against SSM prohibitions and account for my reservations about it.  Then, I shall propose an alternative argument with roots in constitutional law that since SSM prohibitions do not survive liberal scrutiny, they must be rejected.  

Why Liberals (Might) Want to Recognize SSM
Familiarly, in response to the question “What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as equals?” Ronald Dworkin famously answers that “government must be neutral on what might be called the questions of the good life.”​[5]​ Following Dworkin, it is commonly supposed that a commitment to neutrality is at least partly constitutive of liberalism— that a liberal state should not promote or justify its actions by appeal to controversial conceptions of the good life.  So, it would seem that if a liberal state is going to recognize SSM it must do so within the boundaries of liberal neutrality.
Some arguments against SSM prohibitions appeal directly to Dworkin’s account of liberal neutrality.  Here is one representative example:
The basic rationale for marriage lies in its serving certain legitimate and important interests of married couples.  But many same-sex couples have the same interests, which marriage would serve in essentially the same way.  So restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples is a denial of equality.  There is no way of justifying this denial of equality without appealing to controversial conceptions of the good (such as the moral superiority of heterosexuality or the procreative family); and it is a basic principle of liberalism that the state should not promote, or justify its actions by appeal to, such controversial conceptions of the good.  So the institution of marriage ought to be reformed so as to allow same-sex couples to marry.​[6]​  
This sort of argument puts tremendous pressure on opponents of SSM to propose some neutral rationale for opposing SSM given that a long line of liberal thinkers from Mill to Feinberg suppose that not just any rationale suffices.  In particular, liberals reject legal moralism—that is, they will deny that it a morally good reason to limit someone’s liberty either because their conduct is inherently immoral, or in order to preserve a traditional way of life or enforce popular morality or perfect human character, for example.​[7]​
However, liberal philosophers should not take it for granted that prohibition of SSM must violate liberal neutrality; at least, some such arguments justifying SSM prohibitions ostensibly proceed on grounds that liberals can accept.​[8]​ Indeed, some opponents of SSM argue that recognition of SSM, not its prohibition, is illiberal: 
Liberalism does not require legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  In fact, it cannot, since legal recognition is incompatible with… principles of liberalism… The push for legal recognition of same-sex marriage, though often packaged as being motivated or required by liberal reasons, is in fact illiberal.​[9]​
And arguably, while liberalism will not tolerate the imposition of some particular religious conception of the good life on unwilling proponents of SSM, the “liberal sword cuts both ways”:
American citizens should not have the sectarian beliefs of gay-marriage advocates imposed on them unwillingly… The requirement that homosexual attachments be publicly recognized as no different from, and equally necessary to society as, heterosexual attachments is a fundamentally illiberal demand.​[10]​
These passages are, of course, the conclusions of arguments and not arguments themselves and I doubt that the arguments for them are cogent.​[11]​ Still, the liberal who supposes that any argument in support of SSM prohibitions must proceed on illiberal grounds is simply mistaken and the bare appeal to liberal neutrality leaves these ostensibly liberal arguments against SSM untouched.  
	Suppose that the liberal does worry that recognizing SSM is illiberal—that recognition of SSM will violate liberal neutrality.  One way to block this objection is to articulate a rationale for SSM’s recognition that everyone could (or would) reasonably accept.  Suppose that M is a necessary means for realizing S.  Suppose also that some people have a serious desire for S, where a desire counts as a “serious desire” if and only if there is widespread agreement that there are good reasons for the state to support and assist people’s attempts to fulfill it and strong reasons for the state not to impede or hinder people’s attempts to fulfill it. Finally, suppose that the existence of M depends upon its legal recognition by the state.  If neither the recognition of M nor the realization of M and S imposes serious burdens on anyone else and violates no principles of justice, then a liberal state should not legally prohibit M.​[12]​ Since even reasonable individuals who believe that there is nothing especially morally valuable or virtuous about M would presumably allow that the state should not legally prevent people from satisfying serious desires when the satisfaction of those desires burdens no one and violates no principles of justice, the liberal state need not adopt any controversial view about the good life to justify permitting M.​[13]​ But, arguably, many individuals have a serious desire to marry their partner who happens to be of the same-sex. And satisfaction of that serious desire certainly requires the recognition of SSM.  So:
To fulfill this desire effectively, same-sex couples need to enter a relationship that has a social meaning of the appropriate kind. For this, they need the legal status of marriage, since… the social meaning is tied to this legal status.  In effect, they need to be able to say that they are married.​[14]​
So, as long as the recognition of SSM neither serious burdens anyone else nor violates any principles of justice, a liberal state should (at least) refrain from legally prohibiting it.
I am sympathetic with this line of reasoning, but it is not unproblematic.  I confess I am no more certain how to spell out the content of the relevant desire than I am sure how to spell out the content of the relevant right claim.  Worse, I am simply uncertain that the relevant desires of every individual who would exercise the right to SSM if it were recognized all have the same propositional object—that they all want the very same thing and desire it under the same description.  Further, much depends on whether the content of the relevant desire is given a “coarse-grained” or “fine-grained” rendering.  On a coarse-grained rendering, the relevant desire is simply the desire to marry simpliciter—the very same right that typical opposite-sex couples have and sometimes exercise.​[15]​ By contrast, on a fine-grained rendering, the content of the desire is rather more detailed and specific; for example, the relevant desire might be described as a desire to “marry somebody one loves” or “to marry whomever you share a serious desire to wed” or some such thing.  If the relevant desire is given a coarse-grained reading, some opponents of SSM will object that the state has already provided its citizens with the means to satisfy it; arguably, SSM prohibitions do not frustrate the right to marry per se.  But then the demand that liberal states recognize SSM lest they frustrate some serious desire is unfounded.​[16]​  By contrast, if the relevant desire is given a fine-grained rendering then it is much less clear that it really is a serious desire after all.  For example, if the relevant desire is the desire to “marry someone that I love” or “to marry my same-sex partner” it may well fail to count as a serious desire since it is debatable whether there is widespread agreement that there are good reasons for the state to support and assist people’s attempts to fulfill such desires; surely very many people believe that there are strong reasons for the state to impede or hinder their attempts. 
	Even if these worries can be overcome, the liberal who takes her commitment to neutrality seriously has to worry about determining whether recognition of SSM seriously burdens anyone else.  A citizen of Baltimore City filed a motion to intervene in a Maryland case about SSM asserting that since “the homosexual lifestyle [was] against [her] religion, permitting SSM would burden her right to freedom of religion.”  Not surprisingly, the motion was denied.​[17]​ But other protests demand a more serious hearing: perhaps recognition of SSM would force the unwilling to associate with homosexuals over their objections; perhaps some individuals object to having their tax money used to subsidize the marriages of homosexual persons; perhaps some people are seriously offended specifically by same-sex marriage itself (if not same-sex coupling per se) and recognition of SSM increases the likelihood of coming into contact with homosexual couples who were not simply “together” but genuinely married.​[18]​  By what standard can the liberal distinguish serious and genuine burdens from slight and superfluous ones? 
The liberal could either appeal to some objective standard for determining whether a “burden” is genuine and serious or else appeal to the subjective beliefs and values of the complainant.  However, articulating an objective standard is bound to weaken the liberal’s commitment to neutrality with respect to questions of the good life.​[19]​  At least, it is difficult to provide a defensible rationale for asserting that some burdens are not genuine or serious without appealing to come conception of what is really valuable, and it is difficult to defend that conception of what is really valuable without appealing to some conception of the good life.  But the more seriously the liberal state takes the subjective beliefs and values of the complainant, the more likely that alleged burdens are genuine and serious and the more likely that SSM prohibitions can be sustained on liberal grounds.
While I am skeptical that a bare appeal to liberal neutrality will suffice to show that SSM prohibitions are unjustifiable, I do not suppose that recognition of SSM must violate liberal neutrality either.  In any event, not all liberals accept that liberalism’s primary and constitutive commitment is to neutrality.​[20]​ Arguably, liberalism’s fundamental and constitutive commitment is not to ensuring neutrality, but liberty.  In what follows, I shall argue that a plausible way of understanding liberalism’s constitutive commitment to liberty suffices to show that prohibitions of SSM are illiberal.

Liberalism and Rational Basis Review
	In an especially liberal moment, Mill declares that “the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty” and that “The a priori assumption is in favour of freedom”​[21]​ and many contemporary liberals agree.​[22]​ Indeed one contemporary liberal identifies Mill’s declaration as the “Fundamental Liberal Principle: the (FLP).​[23]​  The (FLP) does not absolutely preclude liberty-limiting legislation: liberty-limiting legislation is permissible only if (FLP)’s demands can be met, but not if not.  Further, (FLP) is consistent with liberalism’s preference for using narrowly tailored and minimally restrictive means to realize some state interest; given liberalism’s commitment to liberty, if two pieces of legislation, A and B, are equally effective at realizing some state interest, then if B restricts more or greater liberties than A, liberals are committed to rejecting B in favor of A.  
The (FLP) suggests a pro tanto reason to suppose that SSM prohibitions are illiberal: they limit liberty.  But that result is hardly sufficient for proponents of SSM; after all, liberal states sometimes do legitimately limit the liberty of their citizens.  What sort of justification would justify SSM prohibitions on liberal grounds? 
A diversion may be instructive.  In American constitutional law, legislation​[24]​ that either utilizes a suspect classification (such as race) or compromises fundamental rights is subject to a rather stringent test for legitimacy: strict scrutiny.  Legislation survives strict scrutiny only if it is a necessary means and narrowly tailored to realize some compelling state interest.​[25]​  If the relevant interest is not a compelling one, or, if the legislation is not necessary and narrowly tailored to realize that interest, the legislation will not survive strict scrutiny.  This should strike liberal philosophers as just about right.  Fundamental rights are those rights that are either deeply ingrained in our nation’s history and traditions (such as the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment) or such that ordered liberty itself could not exist without their guarantee (such as, say, the right to privacy).  Frustrating rights that are deeply ingrained in our nation’s history would very likely frustrate the liberty and autonomy of a citizenry that probably had come to count on and rely upon the free exercise of those rights, and even a minimal commitment to liberty demands protecting ordered liberty itself.  No surprise, then, that not much legislation survives strict scrutiny.  
By contrast, rational basis review is the least stringent test for legitimacy requiring only that legislation bears a reasonable relationship to the attainment of a legitimate governmental objective, a rather weaker standard.  On one account of things, “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis,” legislation survives rational basis review.​[26]​ Not surprisingly, most legislation survives rational basis review.  Indeed, at least one notable jurist objects to this way of understanding rational basis review on the grounds that it is “difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be supported by a ‘reasonably conceivable state of facts’” such that rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.”​[27]​
But perhaps not.  Recently, in Romer v. Evans SCOTUS struck down a proposed amendment to the Colorado constitution that would have effectively prohibited certain legal protections for homosexuals, partly because the proposed amendment “cannot be said to be directed to an identifiable legitimate purpose.” At some greater length:
…if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.  Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. …its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.​[28]​
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas SCOTUS struck down a Texas law prohibiting consensual acts of sodomy between same-sex partners, partly because Texas’ law “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”​[29]​  So, the seemingly insurmountable burden required to show that legislation fails rational basis review can apparently be met.
	While the Romer majority found a scarcity of legitimate state interests justifying the Colorado amendment, Justice Scalia found them with ease.  In a vigorous dissent, Scalia insists that “there is no doubt of a rational basis for the substance of the prohibition at issue here,” say, “to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores” or “to preserve traditional American moral values.”​[30]​ Scalia’s position in Romer requires endorsing a broad version of legal moralism, again, an uncontroversially illiberal liberty-limiting principle.  Scalia’s anti-liberal leanings are especially clear in the following discussion of an Indiana ordinance prohibiting “indecent behavior”:
Perhaps the dissenters believe that “offense to others” ought to be the only reason for restricting nudity in public places generally, but there is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that Thoreauvian “you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else” beau ideal… The purpose of Indiana’s nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to one another, even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd.  Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, contra bonos mores, i.e., immoral.​[31]​
Clearly, then, at least one underlying dispute between liberal and illiberal jurists—like Scalia—concerns the facts that could constitute a rational basis for legislation.  
Recall the above suggestion that legislation will survive rational basis review “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.”  I submit that liberal jurists, but not illiberal ones, will endorse the following principle: 
The Rational Basis Principle (RBP): If legislation limits liberty then that legislation is illiberal unless it bears a reasonably conceivable rational relationship to a liberally legitimate state interest
(RBP) coheres nicely with Mill’s (FLP) insofar as it requires some justification of liberty-limiting legislation and, I think, goes a long way to capturing liberalism’s constitutive commitment to liberty.  Further, given that liberals will not suppose that the prevention of immoral behavior per se or the preservation of a traditional way of life amounts to a legitimate state interest, (RBP) coheres well with liberal misgivings about Scalia’s jurisprudence.  

Liberal Rational Basis Review
	Still, if (RBP) is going to be at all useful for present purposes, at least two matters require clarification.  First, (RBP) says nothing about what differentiates liberally legitimate state interests—that is, a state interest that a liberal would acknowledge as such—from a liberally illegitimate ones.  There is a danger of stipulating the problem away, but liberty-limiting legislation probably does not serve a liberally legitimate state interest unless it prevents something akin to preventing either harm or offense—that is, unless it prevents either wrongful setbacks to interests or the infliction of right-violating disliked mental states. At least, the more similar some putative state interest is to the prevention of harm and serious offense, the more likely that it is to be a liberally legitimate interest.  Similarly, the less similar some putative state interest is to the prevention of harm and serious offense, the less likely it amounts to a liberally legitimate one.  I am supposing, then, that a liberal state may well have a legitimate interest in preventing more than just harm and serious offense, properly understood, just so long as that interest is sufficiently analogous to the prevention of, say, right violating conduct or setbacks to interest.​[32]​  
Since it is difficult to see how the preservation of sexual mores per se could prevent interests from being setback, it is not likely that a liberal state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting consensual acts of sodomy.  Similarly, since it is unclear how unwilling spectators could be have their rights violated by consenting adults gratuitously displaying their genitals behind closed doors, it is not likely that a liberal state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting fully nude dancing.  These results are significant since, first, it seems that (RBP) is not a trivial principle given that it precludes some kinds of legislation, and second, it coheres well with liberal intuitions about actual legislation.  So far, so good.
Clarification is needed for a second reason, however, given that (RBP) calls for, not a conceivable rational relationship to some liberally legitimate state interest, but a reasonably conceivable rational relationship.  Legislation bears a rational relationship to some interest just in case that legislation tends to promote that interest to some non-trivial degree.  But what is it, exactly, to reasonably conceive of such a relationship? 
	Philosophical interest in the thesis that conceivability entails possibility has peaked recently and many philosophers have wondered about its implications for the reducibility of the mental to the physical, the unity of the sciences, the truth of naturalism generally, and so forth.​[33]​ Undoubtedly, ‘conceivability’ is a philosophical term of art and there is a real danger of equivocating here.  Still, several distinctions should be noted.  
First, “prima facie conceivability” is distinct from “ideal conceivability”: P is prima facie conceivable for a subject when P is conceivable on first appearances while P is ideally conceivable when P is conceivable after ideal rational reflection.​[34]​ Clearly, something that is prima facie conceivable might not be ideally conceivable and vice versa: the belief that water could have been something besides H2O might not be sustainable following more idealized reflection and perhaps fairly idealized reflection is needed to conceive of some complicated true mathematical proposition.  While articulating just what is necessary for ideal conceivability is a tricky business, it is plausibly taken to depend upon undefeatable justification—that is, justification that cannot be defeated by better reasoning.  Undefeatable justification would involve, at least, the absence of the usual sort of cognitive limitations and external impediments to knowledge: it would require the absence of external conditions that undermine justification; it would presumably require that acquisition of further true and justified beliefs would not lead result in the revision of the relevant belief, and so forth.​[35]​  Things can surely come in degrees here: the more apt a subject’s belief is to be defeated by better reasoning, the less that subject approximates ideal conceivability; by contrast, the less apt a subject’s belief is to be defeated by better reasoning, the more that subject approximates ideal conceivability.  
Second, “positive conceivability” is distinct from “negative conceivability”: P is negatively possible for a subject when P cannot be “ruled out” a priori—that is, when a subject cannot conceive of not-P a priori—while P is positively conceivable when, roughly, a subject can form some sort of positive conception of a situation in which P is the case.​[36]​ Idealization does some work here too: if I can rule out P a priori but some other cognitively idealized agent cannot, then P is not negatively conceivable.  Similarly, P might be positively conceivable only given some contingent ability to know something else: perhaps understanding quantum physics is necessary to positively conceive of a many-worlds interpretation in any interesting sense.  Roughly, P is positively conceivable just in case a subject can “coherently modally imagine” a situation that verifies P such that it is possible to fill in any missing details about that situation without contradiction.​[37]​  And filling in those details may well be beyond the reach of some subjects. Some subjects would be able to fill in the relevant details if they simply performed a modest bit of research or reflection to augment their present beliefs and thus are at least able to positively conceive of P even if they cannot presently.  By contrast, some of us will never understand complicated propositions of mathematics or physics such that we do not and cannot positively conceive some propositions.
These distinctions can be used simultaneously.  Prima facie negative conceivability only requires not being able to rule out P based on initial appearances while something approaching ideal negative conceivability demands not being able to rule out P after rather more consideration. Prima facie positive conceivability requires only a modest imagination constrained by rather little while idealized positive conceivability requires a rather complicated and informed imaginative exercise.  
	How, then, should reasonable conceivability be understood?  I take it that it requires positive conceivability and not negative conceivability.  At least, liberals will demand positive conceivability given that the FLP demands that proponents of liberty-limiting legislation justify that legislation.  As such, reasonable conceivability requires more than simply insisting that one cannot rule out some state of affairs in which legislation would tend to serve some liberally legitimate interest.​[38]​ As such, legislation is reasonably conceivable only if some cognizer can modally imagine a situation in which that legislation does tend to promote some legitimate state interest and, at least to some degree, fill in missing details about that situation without contradiction.
Reasonable conceivability surely requires more than prima facie conceivability as well. Part of the problem is that requiring only prima facie conceivability would make rational basis review a toothless test for legitimacy; if legitimacy only requires conceiving of some state of affairs consistent with appearances in which legislation tends to serve some legitimate state interest, then it is difficult to imagine legislation that would not survive.  But reasonable conceivability does not require ideal conceivability either; generally, that which is reasonable need not be ideal.  I submit that reasonable conceivability requires moderate conceivability, something between prima facie and idealized conceivability.  Roughly, a subject can moderately conceive of P just in case her belief that P is conceivable will not easily be defeated by moderately better reasoning—that is, just in case her belief that P is conceivable is consistent with the vast majority of other true justified beliefs she has and with true propositions that she could reasonably be expected to believe.  So, whether or not P is moderately conceivable is, to some extent, fixed by certain facts about the actual world; if it is actually the case that some subject would abandon her belief that P is conceivable if she only thought a bit harder about the matter or if she did a bit more research then P is not moderately conceivable.  For example, suppose that it actually is the case that a judge can conceive, consistent with present appearances, of a situation in which someone besides Jones might have killed Smith but that some presently unopened letter marked as evidence on the judge’s otherwise uncluttered desk contains information that would convince him of Jones’ guilt.  Even if the judge can prima facie positively conceive of situation in which Jones is innocent, he cannot moderately conceive of such a situation.  Roughly, P is not moderately conceivable for some subject if she would not believe that P given somewhat better reasoning—that is, given somewhat more informed reflection, somewhat more coherent reasoning, and so forth.  Alternatively, moderately conceiving of P requires conceiving of P largely, but not indefeasibly, free of epistemic defeaters.​[39]​ 
So long as neither prima facie or ideal conceivability is required for reasonable conceivability, something like what I am calling moderate conceivability must be appropriate for rational basis review.  Further, moderate conceivability does not demand that judges (or whoever) be experts in fields outside the law or that appellate courts become “super-legislatures.”  It only demands that the reasoning relevant to the evaluation of legislation is subject to at least reasonable epistemic standards.  So unless we entirely suspend reasonable epistemic standards with respect to the evaluation of legislation, it must be the case that legislation survives rational basis review only if it is moderately conceivable that it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Recall that (RBP) demands that legislation bears a reasonably conceivable—that is, positively and moderately conceivable—rational relationship to some liberally legitimate state interest.  So, (RBP) can be restated as follows: 
(RBP*): If legislation limits liberty then that legislation is illiberal unless it is possible i) to coherently modally imagine a situation in which that legislation ii) will tend, to a non-trivial degree, to promote a state interest iii) that at least approximates the prevention of wrongful setbacks to interests or right-violating offense, and iv) no somewhat better reasoning would defeat the justification that such a situation is conceivable
In what follows, (RBP) is shorthand for the more complicated thesis expressed by (RBP*).  I submit that (RBP) is consistent with the legal traditions of liberal states and independently attractive to liberally inclined philosophers: whatever else is required for legislation to survive liberal scrutiny, it must at least survive this sort of evaluation.  Thus, (RBP) is a useful way of articulating liberalism’s commitment to liberty.  It is equally useful for constructing an argument that SSM prohibitions are illiberal.

The Rational Basis Argument
The above discussion of liberalism’s constitutive commitment to liberty suggests the following “Rational Basis Argument” that prohibiting SSM is unjustifiable on liberal grounds:
1)	If legislation limits liberty then that legislation is illiberal unless it bears a reasonably conceivable rational relationship to a liberally legitimate state interest
2)	SSM prohibitions limit liberty
3)	SSM prohibitions bear no reasonably conceivable rational relationship to a liberally legitimate state interest
4)	Therefore, SSM prohibitions are illiberal
Since 1) is simply a restatement of (RBP), it is true if (RBP) is.  The remaining two premises require at least some discussion.
Premise 2) seems to me true but not beyond dispute.  Clear examples of liberty-limiting legislation includes legislation that legally prohibits performing the very action that some citizen or citizens want to and otherwise would perform, say, forbidding voters from entering polling places based on their race.  But ensuring that there are sufficient obstacles in place to prevent citizens from easily exercising their rights will also limit liberty, say, by enacting excessive poll taxes and by requiring an exceptionally long waiting period for abortive services.  But some legislation is not plausibly regarded as liberty-limiting legislation at all, even if it impacts the ability of citizens to act in ways that they want to.  For example, the NEH might institute a policy that makes opportunities and resources available to historians but not philosophers.  While historians would seemingly be enabled in a way that philosophers are not, it would not follow that the liberty of philosophers had been undermined or limited even though the NEH’s actions would impact the ability of philosophers to act in ways that they want to.  Generally, making opportunities available to only A but not B need not limit B’s liberty.  Arguably, SSM prohibitions are akin NEH policies making opportunities available to historians but not philosophers: neither actively prevents anyone from doing anything but only limit the scope of a service that the state provides. Since NEH policies that make opportunities available only to historians do not really limit liberty, parity of reasoning suggests that SSM prohibitions do not either such that 2) is false.​[40]​  
However, this analogy is suspect and the conclusion false.  The problem is not that the imagined NEH policy positively enables some persons while SSM prohibitions preclude others from acting.  Rather, the analogy is suspect because while philosophers are free to seek other equivalent arrangements to support their research even given the NEH policy, same-sex couples are not similarly free to seek other equivalent arrangements given SSM prohibitions.  Civil unions and registered partnerships are somewhat similar to civil marriage but only a handful of states make either available to same-sex couples.​[41]​  Further, there are significant rights and protections and privileges associated with civil marriage not associated with either civil unions or registered partnerships (including significant federal tax benefits and legal guarantees).  Second, at least some same-sex couples would wed if not but for SSM prohibitions.  Historically, same-sex couples have encountered sympathetic clerks and judges and mayors who willingly issue marriage licenses. Thus, unlike the imagined NEH policy, SSM prohibitions do deny (at least some) same-sex couples something they would have had otherwise. And that suggests not just that SSM prohibitions are significantly different from policies that selectively enable academics, but that SSM prohibitions do limit liberty.
The crucial premise of the Rational Basis argument, then, is 3): SSM prohibitions bear no reasonably conceivable rational relationship to a liberally legitimate state interest.  I cannot pretend to consider every possible state interest, but reflection on recent decisions of various courts will prove instructive here.  I contend that no live justification of SSM prohibitions constitutes a state interest that a liberal would regard as legitimate that is rationally related to SSM prohibitions.  In what follows, I consider a series of state interests that have been advanced in support of SSM prohibitions.  I argue that none of them are both legitimate by liberal standards and rationally related to SSM prohibitions.  

1)	Tradition and Marriage
In defense of SSM prohibitions, a state might assert an interest in affirming its traditional commitment to understanding marriage as a union of a man and a woman or promoting the integrity of traditional marriage or to promote the traditional family unit.​[42]​ However, this rationale requires adopting broad legal moralism—the principle that it is a morally good reason to limit someone’s liberty if doing so preserves a traditional way of or enforces morality. And, as noted above, legal moralism is an uncontroversially illiberal liberty-limiting principle.  Thus, appeals to tradition and marriage are non-starters to demonstrate that SSM prohibitions will survive liberal rational basis review.

2)	Financial Interests and Public Subsidies
Alternatively, a state could argue that it has a legitimate interest in protecting its fisc from the effects of recognizing SSM.​[43]​ Presumably, if SSM were recognized, then such marriages would need to be subsidized and that could tax limited financial resources that might be otherwise dedicated to serve other legitimate and even compelling state interests.  Arguably, then, the state’s interest in protecting and preserving valuable financial resources suffices to justify prohibiting SSM.  However straightforward this sort of justification appears, it ultimately fails to demonstrate an adequate rational basis in support of SSM prohibitions.
It is an open question whether there is a liberally legitimate interest here.  The enforcement of any legislation will incur some costs that liberals may well have to grudgingly bear, even if that legislation does not protect fundamental rights or compelling interests. But suppose that a state’s asserted interest in protecting its fisc is a legitimate one.  It is doubtful that SSM prohibitions would tend at all to promote that interest.  The various assertions that recognition of SSM would diminish a state’s tax base, exhaust its resources to fund social security, and so forth are not uncommon but are typically made without appeal to any evidence whatsoever.​[44]​ As such, it is at least far from clear that opponents of SSM have really reasonably conceived of a situation in which SSM prohibitions are rationally related to a legitimate interest. Worse, there is at least some reason to suppose that recognition of SSM is actually cost-effective; a recent report of the Congressional Budget Office found that allowing same-sex couples to marry in all fifty states would save the federal government nearly one billion dollars a year, while other studies suggest that Connecticut could increase state revenues between 3.1 million and 13 million per year in the first three years of permitting SSM while Vermont could reap between 18.1 and 22.8 million.​[45]​ This suggests that recognition of SSM will actually enhance a state’s fisc, not threaten it.  Admittedly, this response to the present objection is somewhat contingent on empirical verification.  However, it does appear that somewhat better reasoning would defeat the objection in which case opponents of SSM still have not reasonably conceived of a situation in which SSM prohibitions are rationally related to a legitimate interest.
Further, a liberal state could surely find the resources to fund or subsidize SSM in a way that will not threaten its fisc: it could, for example, raise fees for marriage licenses or require a greater fee for applying for a SSM license in particular or introduce some milage for jurisdictions that demand SSM; alternatively, it could separate either SSM or civil marriage generally from the familiar tax benefits and resources associated with civil marriage such that it winds up not subsidizing SSM at all.  If rather minimal reasoning suggests plausible ways for protecting a state’s fisc, then even if the state does have a legitimate interest in preserving its fisc, SSM prohibitions bear no reasonably conceivable rational relationship to it.  

3)	Protection of Civil Liberties
Consider also the worry that prohibiting SSM is necessary to protect the civil liberties of citizens who would be wrongly affected by its recognition. Again, the usual claim in support of SSM prohibitions is not that the very recognition of SSM violates anyone’s rights.  Rather, the argument typically is that prohibiting SSM will either i) protect the financial liberties of unwilling opponents of SSM who would be forced involuntarily to subsidize SSM​[46]​ or ii) protect their liberties of association or religious freedom.  Arguably, recognition of SSM would require unwilling landlords to rent to same-sex married couples​[47]​ and unwilling employers to extend benefits to same-sex spouses​[48]​ and religious organizations involved in adoption would be forced to place children in same-sex households​[49]​, all in violation of their right of association.  Undoubtedly, liberal states have a legitimate interest in protecting both the financial and civil liberties of its citizens, but here too, it is fairly doubtful that prohibiting SSM is rationally related to that interest. 
Consider first the possibility that SSM prohibitions would tend to protect the financial liberties of those forced to subsidize SSM unwillingly.  This sort of argument only gets started if it is really the case that involuntarily subsidizing SSM approximates a wrongful setback to interests, and it is far from clear that this is so.  It is imply unclear how to validate the assumption that one’s incurred tax burden goes to fund one program or policy rather than some other.  If defense spending constitutes 31% of the Congressional budget for the United States (and I offer this figure arbitrarily) does it follow that 31% of my taxes fund national defense?  If so, then given that only a terribly small percent of any state’s budget would need to be dedicated to subsidizing SSM, the incurred tax burden on unwilling opponents of SSM would be similarly terribly small, arguably too small to constitute a burden.  
But suppose that the relevant tax burden that would be incurred does approximate a setback to interests.  It would still not follow that SSM prohibitions would tend to prevent unwilling opponents of SSM from involuntarily subsidizing SSM, partly for reasons I have already suggested.  If the public fisc of states that recognize SSM will generally increase, then no one’s tax burden need be increased and thus their financial interests are not set back.  Thus, SSM prohibitions bear no reasonably conceivable rational relationship to this liberally legitimate state interest.
The argument that SSM prohibitions will tend to protect the right of association of unwilling opponents of SSM is more intriguing.  The problem with the argument is that, here too, it assumes that recognition of SSM would thereby setback some interest had by opponents of SSM.  But recognition of SSM per se would not require unwilling opponents of SSM to rent to same-sex couples or extend benefits to same-sex spouses, for example.  Instead, legislation that prohibits private acts of discrimination—legislation akin to the 1964 Civil Rights Act—would be responsible for that.  And presumably, liberals are already inclined to support anti-discrimination legislation that already precludes refusing to hire someone or rent to them based on their sexual orientation.  At this point, opponents of SSM who take up this strategy face a dilemma: opponents of SSM must either oppose all legislation that prohibits private acts of discrimination or else deny right of association protects any and every act of private discrimination.​[50]​ The first horn of this dilemma surely shocks the conscience of the liberal while the second requires abandoning this defense of SSM prohibitions.  

4)	Procreation and Child-Rearing
Without a doubt, the interests most commonly advanced in support of prohibiting SSM concern procreation and child-rearing and, almost without exception, courts that have uphold the legitimacy of SSM prohibitions explicitly appeal to them.​[51]​ It is certainly not uncommon to incorporate appeals to the need to secure the benefits of marriage for future generations of children into the very legislation prohibiting SSM.​[52]​ And it is difficult to deny that a state has a legitimate interest in both procreation and child-rearing.  Following Mill, liberals can agree; recall that Mill supposes that laws forcing to-be-married parties to prove they have the means for supporting a child are not “objectionable as violations of liberty.”​[53]​ The question, then, is whether SSM prohibitions bear a reasonably conceivable rational relationship to this state interest.
Some proponents of SSM have too quickly dismissed the possibility that there is a reasonably conceivable rational relationship here, having rested content with noting that prohibitions of SSM do not facilitate procreation anymore than recognition of SSM decreases live-birth rates.​[54]​  So, it will be helpful to articulate the argument that has impressed so many courts.  Here is one especially clear example of the argument that I have in mind from a recent decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals:
[The state] has a legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the stable environment traditionally associated with marriage, and… limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that interest.  Essentially, the State asserts that by legally sanctioning a heterosexual relationship through marriage, thereby imposing both obligations and benefits on the couple and inserting the State in the relationship, the State communicates to parents and prospective parents that their long-term, committed relationships are uniquely important as a public concern.​[55]​
I refer to this argument as the “Responsible Parenting Rationale” and it rests on at least three assumptions; first, it is desirable to take measures to ensure that biological parents avoid “irresponsible parenting,” either by producing children out of wedlock or by separating and disrupting a stable family unit; second, civil marriage is correlated with attractive rights and benefits that serve as incentives for unmarried couples to marry and for presently married couples to remain so; finally, same-sex couples who cannot produce out-of-wedlock children cannot engage in irresponsible parenting.  Thus, the state has a reason to make civil marriage available to opposite-sex couples—to discourage irresponsible parenting—that does not echo in support of SSM.  As such, opponents of SSM need not appeal to any dubious conceptual connection between marriage and procreation.  Instead, the rationale is that opposite-sex relationships are uniquely important as a public concern because, unlike same-sex relationships, they can generate undesirable results of undeniable public concern.
	The Responsible Parenting Rationale is bound to strike proponents of SSM as perverse: a cynical observer could note that it effectively rewards opposite-sex couples with the incentives of civil marriage because they can engage in irresponsible parenting while same-sex couples are not similarly rewarded because they cannot.  But my cynic best recall Rawls’ Difference Principle that permits social inequalities so long as those inequalities work to everyone’s advantage.​[56]​ If discouraging irresponsible parenting really works to everyone’s advantage, prohibiting SSM would not necessarily be illiberal.
Still, the cynical complaint is not without force and, I think, the Responsible Parenting Rationale fails to demonstrate a rational relationship between SSM prohibitions and the state’s legitimate interest in child-rearing and procreation.  First, legislation restricting civil marriage to opposite-sex couples based on the Responsible Parenting Rationale is either unacceptably overbroad or unduly narrow.  It is overbroad if it supposes that the class of opposite-sex couples is isomorphic with the class of couples who can engage in irresponsible parenting: elderly and otherwise sterile couples cannot produce out of wedlock children, for example.  So, parity of reasoning suggests that the Responsible Parenting Rationale permits prohibiting elderly or sterile couples from marrying, a result that surely smacks of illiberality.  It might be replied that even if sterile opposite-sex couples cannot reproduce, they could still engage in irresponsible parenting: they can adopt or care for foster children and then later separate.  Thus, they should be able to marry and reap the benefits of civil marriage to encourage stability.  But then the Responsible Parenting Rationale is unduly narrow: same-sex couples can similarly engage in irresponsible parenting by adopting or caring for foster children and later divorcing or separating.  Parity of reasoning suggests if prohibiting sterile couples from marrying is illiberal, so are SSM prohibitions.
	Second, it is doubtful that making the benefits of civil marriage available to opposite-sex couples is effective in promoting responsible parenting.  As many opponents of SSM have stressed repeatedly, divorce rates have steadily increased as have incidences of illegitimate births despite the attractive benefits of civil marriage.  Here is one representative complaint:
…every state [has] adopted some form of no-fault divorce, and for the first time in our nation’s history, the understanding of marriage as a permanent social and spiritual contract [is] no longer backed by law… The growth and normalization of cohabitation—which our parents and past generations of parents referred to as “living in sin”—has also had a devastating impact.  It has increased 850 percent since 1960.  Add this to a…failed social experiment—the Sexual Revolution and its consequent rise in out-of-wedlock births—and you can see how marriage and children have suffered.​[57]​
It is at least difficult to maintain both that restricting the benefits of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples will encourage responsible parenting while lamenting its failure to do so.  My intent here is not simply to run an ad hominem argument against certain opponents of SSM on the grounds that they do not really endorse their own justification of SSM prohibitions.  Rather, my point is, first, that given the available evidence—evidence that is fairly widely accessible and well-known to many opponents of SSM—it is not reasonably conceivable that prohibiting SSM would tend to discourage irresponsible parenting. 
	At this point, the proponent of SSM prohibitions might object that even if it is not clear that prohibiting SSM does not perfectly advance a legitimate state interest—either because they SSM prohibitions would fail to prevent some instances of irresponsible parenting or because we have evidence that they doesn’t work—they still might advance a state interest to some degree. And legitimacy surely does not require that legislation perfectly promote an interest, only that it promotes it to some degree.  But even if this response is legitimate—and this is the third reason for denying that SSM prohibitions bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest in child-rearing—given the liberal commitment to liberty expressed in (FLP), encouraging responsible parenting does not justify prohibiting SSM if that interest can be realized by other less restrictive measures.  But other less restrictive measures are available: a liberal state can encourage responsible parenting while permitting SSM by using a carrot or a stick.  A liberal state could recognize SSM but provide special benefits to biological parents who stay married and care for their progeny.  Alternatively, it could both recognize SSM but penalize parents who divorce or separate while children are in their care or refuse to subsidize parents who produce out-of-wedlock children.  In either case, the state encourages responsible parenting without also restricting liberty by prohibiting SSM; any of these measures should be preferable to liberal states.
	The most familiar proposed state interests advanced in support of SSM are either not interests that a liberal would regard as legitimate or else not rationally related to prohibiting SSM.  The suspicion now has to be very strong that SSM prohibitions do not survive what a liberal would regard as rational basis review.  But then the Rational Basis argument appears sound such that prohibitions of SSM are illiberal. Generally, the liberal state must permit what it cannot reasonably forbid, and, since permitting same-sex couples to marry requires legally recognizing their marriages in the same way that opposite-sex marriages are recognized, the liberal state must recognize SSM.  So, liberal states are, after all, committed to legally recognizing SSM.  Thus, some order is restored to the liberal universe.

Conclusion 
	I have suggested that liberalism is plausibly understood to involve, at least, a constitutive commitment to liberty, one expressed by my Rational Basis Principle that condemns liberty-limiting legislation as illegitimate unless it bears a reasonably conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.  I also contend that SSM prohibitions do limit liberty but bear no reasonably conceivable rational relationship to anything that a liberal could regard as a legitimate state interest.  Thus, I conclude that SSM prohibitions are illegitimate on liberal grounds.
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